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The insecurity of judicial tenure under the Stuarts was one
of the principal evils culminating in the Revolution of i688.
As a result, through the Act of Settlement, which was adopted
twelve years later, security of tenure through executive appoint-
ment for life or during good behavior became firmly established
in the mother country, and was brought by the Colonists to
American shores. Interference by the crown with that security
of tenure was emphasized in the Declaration of Independence
as one of the causes of the separation. To avoid repetition of
this evil the framers of the Federal Constitution expressly pro-
vided therein that federal judges: "shall hold their offices dur-
ing good behavior and shall at stated times receive for their
services a compensation which shall not be diminished during
their continuance in office." (Federal Constitution, Art. 3,
Sec. I.)
Originally the colonial and state judiciaries were likewise
selected through executive or legislative appointment to serve
during good behavior.
During the first half of the nineteenth century there devel-
oped a rising tide of public sentiment against the appointive
life-tenure judiciary. The trend began among the newly-
formed states west of the Atlantic seaboard. In their more or
less pioneer environment, and through the application of Jeffer-
sonian principles of popular election during the Jacksonian era,
these states departed from the appointive system and adopted
the popular elective system with short terms which has since
•been in vogue. The general hostility to the then existing
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appointive system has been attributed to the popular disfavor
which developed toward some strong life-tenure judges who
tenaciously adhered to English rules and precedents notwith-
standing the temporary unpopularity of English laws following
the Revolution.
Opposition to the courts was increased by a public feeling
that their attitude was unfriendly toward the debtor class. This
feeling was accentuated following the establishment in Marbury
v. Madison of the doctrine of judicial review of the constitu-
tionality of legislation. (i Cranch, 137 [18o3].) It may be
noted here that attempts to check the exercise of judicial power
have usually taken the form of assaults upon the security of
judicial tenure.
At present, the elective method is operative in thirty-six
states. Judges are appointed by the governor with confirmation
by the senate or council in five states, Massachusetts, Maine,
New Hampshire, Delaware, and New Jersey; and appointed
by the legislature in five states, Connecticut, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Vermont and Virginia. In Florida the judges
of the Supreme Court are elected but those of the principal trial
court are appointed by the governor. In California, under the
recent constitutional amendment of 1934, the Supreme and
appellate court judges are appointed by the governor, with con-
firmation by a small council. Trial court judges are elected.
The special committee on Judicial Selection and Tenure
made the following significant report at the sixtieth annual con-
vention of the American Bar Association. (Kansas City, Mo.,
Sept., 1937):
"Of the 36 states in which five years ago election of judges prevailed
and was accepted as inevitable, the bar of 17 states, nearly 50 per cent
of all of them, acting alone or in conjunction with lay agencies, have
taken affirmative steps looking to the adoption of appropriate substitutes
for direct election of judges. In at least 3 other states the bar is pre-
paring to propose similar reform."
Outside the United States judges are selected by appoint-
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ment rather than popular election in all countries except Switz-
erland.
Coming now to Ohio we find that the government estab-
lished pursuant to the Ordinance of 1787 created for the North-
west Territory as principal public officials, a governor, a secre-
tary, and three judges, "any two of whom to form a court, who
shall have a common-law jurisdiction." (Sec. 4). These ap-
pointments were to be made by Congress. After the ratification
of the Federal Constitution, and the passage of the Act of
August 7, 1789 (Journal of Congress IX, io9), continuing the
Ordinance in effect, these appointments were, of course, made
by the President. Under the Constitution of I 802, judges were
appointed by a joint ballot of both houses of the general assem-
bly. (Art. VI, Sec. 8). The Constitution of i85i removed all
appointive power from the legislature and declared that the
judges should be elected by vote of the people. Therefore,
since the effective date of the Constitution of 185 1, we have had
popular election of judges in Ohio.
There have been two changes particularly affecting judges
since i85i-the direct primary and the non-partisan ballot.
From 1851 to 1912 judges were nominated by political party
conventions. In 1912 a constitutional amendment was adopted
providing for the direct primary as the method of nomination.
The non-partisan ballot was established by Legislative Act in
1911. The consequence of the last two changes produced an
anomalous situation. By the adoption of the primary system
the judge was required to declare his political party allegiance
and as a partisan go forth to seek the nomination. If nom-
inated, he immediately became a non-partisan for the general
election because his name appeared on the non-partisan ballot.
(Independent candidates may be nominated by petition. Judges
of municipal courts and justices of the peace are nominated by
petition). This is the system we have in Ohio today.
The first significant step toward a change in the present
method of selecting judges in Ohio was the Cincinnati Confer-
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ence held October 2o, 1934, under the auspices of the Ohio
State Bar Association, the Cincinnati Bar Association, and the
Law School of the University of Cincinnati. All proceedings of
this Conference were reported in the University of Cincinnati
Law Review, Volume VIII, No. 4 (November, I934). There
were approximately 200 leading members of the Bar present
from all parts of the state.
At the conclusion of the Conference, questionnaires were
filled out by those present and Professor C. Fred Luberger of
the College of Law, University of Cincinnati, summarized the
conclusions of the Conference, as reflected by the statements of
the speakers and the questionnaires, as follows:
"By way of summary, it may be stated that, upon the more import-
ant, fundamental aspects of the problem, the conclusions of the confer-
ence were as follows:
i. The courts of Ohio do not measure up to the high standard to
which they should. There is, consequently, general dissatisfaction with
the personnel and the work of the judiciary.
2. In all the courts of the state, in both urban and rural sections, the
present method of selecting judges by popular election has resulted in a
judiciary which is, and permits itself to be, subjected to political and
personal influences, and which is, in too great degree, characterized by
want of legal ability and by the lack of industry, and, in lesser degree,
by arrogance, intolerance, timidity, and indifferent moral character.
3- While some improvement in the personnel of the bench would
probably result from the adoption of more exacting qualifications for
office, and while the bar might be made a somewhat more effective in-
fluence than it now is, more drastic measures are imperative. Only by a
fundamental change in the method of selection of judges can there be
secured to the state a judiciary of the quality and calibre which the people
deserve and ought to desire.
4. It would probably be unwise to confer the sole power of choosing
judges upon a single officer, commission, board, or other body. But, if
that were to be done, the authority and responsibility should be vested in
the governor, who is elected by the people and directly accountable to
them. Confirmation by the senate of the governor's appointments should
not be required. Rather should the governor consult with an advisory
board, qualified by knowledge, experience, and high purpose, before
making his appointments.
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5. The best plan or system for the selection of judges is one wherein
the responsibility is divided between two agencies, at least one of which
is directly responsible to the people of the state, and each of which will
act as a check upon the other. The first would be charged with the duty
of selecting, or nominating, a minimum number of qualified lawyers for
each judicial office to be filled. The second would make the final selec-
tion of the judges from the list of nominees submitted by the first. The
nominating function could best be performed by a commission, the
composition of which should be carefully safeguarded by exacting quali-
fications for membership, and which should be large enough to be rep-
resentative of the interests served and small enough to be responsive to
the demand of painstaking efficiency. The appointive function should be
entrusted to the governor, whose accountability to the electorate of the
state is direct and immediate. No matter how steeped in party politics
he might be, his appointments could be expected to be of the highest
type, for nothing less will be acceptable to the people or to the bar, and
so will become traditional.
6. If the foregoing method of selection by appointment were estab-
lished, the judiciary would be taken out of politics. Lawyers possessing
the ability, the scholarship, and the high character so essential upon the
bench, but who now decline to seek judicial office because of their ab-
horrence of politics, would be attracted more generally to careers upon
the bench and the opportunity for distinguished public service thereby
given.
7. The compensation paid to judges should be, but is not, commen-
surate with the rewards of private practice. Judicial salaries should be
increased, particularly when and if a change in the method of selection
is made and leaders of the bar are thereby made receptive to judicial
office. Pensions, too, should be established, payable upon physical disa-
bility or upon reaching retirement age, but not until a better method of
judicial selection is obtained.
8. It is not advisable to extend the present terms of judicial office
in Ohio to longer periods so long as popular election of judges is retained.
When a new method is established which substantially mitigates the evils
of the present system, then the tenure of the judiciary can with safety,
and should, be considerably extended. Tenure for life or during good
behavior would probably be advisable; but if not that, certainly terms
of not less than twelve or fifteen years in the superior courts, and of
eight or ten years in the inferior courts, ought to be favored."
Meanwhile the Committee on Judicial Administration and
Legal Reform of the Ohio State Bar Association had been
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studying a proposed plan of judicial selection. It had under
consideration five plans of selection; the Cincinnati Conference
plan, which provided for appointment of judges by the gov-
ernor from a list of persons nominated by a commission elected
by the voters; the Cleveland plan, providing for nomination
by the judicial council, appointment by the governor, and con-
firmation by the senate; the Federal plan, which was similar to
the present method of selecting federal judges; the California
plan, which required the appointed judge to "run against his
record" for continuance in office after serving a definite period;
the Wilkin plan, which provided that the governor appoint the
judges with the advice and consent of a judicial commission
composed of ten members selected by the senate.
On May 9, 1935, the Ohio State Bar Association and the
Cincinnati Bar Association joined in conducting a poll of the
State Association's members to determine sentiment for a
change in the method of selection. To the question, "Should
judges of the Supreme Court in Ohio be appointed?" the vote
was "Yes" 1,355, "No" 268. To the question, "Should judges
of the courts of appeals be appointed?" the vote was "Yes"
1,286, "No" 299. Voting on the five proposed plans of selec-
tion, the Cleveland plan, providing for nomination by the
Judicial Council, appointment by the governor and confirma-
tion by the senate, led the field. The Cincinnati Conference
plan, providing for appointment of judges by the governor
from a list of persons nominated by a commission elected by
the voters, ranked second in the poll. In this connection it
should be observed that the views of the lawyers in the smaller
cities and villages showed practically the same percentage vote
for and against the questions submitted as the lawyers in the
large cities.
Another question submitted to the Bar was, "Should judges
of these courts hold office for a term of; 6 years, 12 years, or
good behavior?" The vote was: for six years, 562; for 12 years,
294; for good behavior, 703.
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To the question, "Should a judge be required to 'run against
h;s ecord' in order to continue in office more than six years?"
the ;-ote was, "Yes" 767, "No" 737. (See Ohio BAR, Vol.
VI V No. II [June Io, 1935,1 for tabulation poll.)
z' similar questionnaire to a list of newspapers of Ohio
showed 68 per cent favoring appointment of appellate judges
and 70 per cent favoring appointment of supreme court judges.
(Ohio BAR, Vol. VIII No. 12 [June '7, '935.1)
A subcommittee of the Judicial Administration and Legal
Reform Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association reported
at the annual meeting of the Association in July, 1935, that in
view of the sentiment expressed in the recently conducted poll
of the members of the Bar and the press, "sentiment in favor of
appointed judges of the reviewing courts is crystallizing. We
conclude that, for the present, at least, our advocacy should be
confined to the appointment of judges to the courts of appeals
and Supreme Court."
Whereupon, the Convention referred the proposal back to
the subcommittee for further study and the drafting of a pro-
posed amendment. (Ohio BAR, Vol. VIII No. I5, P. 189.)
(The subcommittee was composed of George R. Murray, Day-
ton, subsequently president of the Ohio State Bar Association;
Robert N. Wilkin, New Philadelphia, former judge of the
Supreme Court of Ohio, and Henry G. Binns, Columbus.)
At the following mid-winter meeting of the Ohio State Bar
Association, held in Toledo, January, 1936, the subcommittee
again reported and submitted a draft of the proposed amend-
ment. The report said:
"It is our earnest desire that this important proposal be given the
fullest possible discussion, destructive as well as constructive criticism
being invited. We will ask that the proposal be referred back to our
committee for referendum vote and report to the 1936 annual meeting."
(Ohio BAR, Vol. VIII No. 42, P. 549)
The proposed amendment was submitted to the Ohio State
Bar Association at the next annual convention, which was held
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in Columbus in July, 1936, and was approved. (Ohio BAR,
Vol. IX, No. 17, P. 223.)
At the following mid-winter meeting of the Ohio State Bar
Association, held in Dayton, January, 1937, Robert N. Wilkin,
New Philadelphia, who had replaced George R. Murray, Day-
ton, as chairman of the subcommittee, reported that:
"Since the Summer Meeting of 1936, we have considered ways and
means of carrying its mandate into effect. Numerous conferences have
been held by the chairman and members of the subcommittee with bar
association officers over the state, and certain conclusions have been
reached. The first is that the necessary constitutional amendment pro-
viding for the appointment of judges should be presented to the people
in November, 1937; that meantime, funds to cover the expenses of an
intensive campaign are to be solicited; that a committee comprised of
representatives of various groups, including labor and the Grange, be
appointed and that publicity be sought in all quarters. This program is
within the authority granted by the Association, and, therefore, no
formal action is now necessary." (Ohio BAR, Vol. IX, No. 39, P-
505)
Shortly thereafter, Joseph C. Hostetler, Cleveland, was
persuaded to accept the chairmanship of a state-wide campaign
committee to sponsor the amendment. He selected as members
of the State Committee prominent men and women represent-
ing various fields of activity. Campaign chairmen were selected
in practically all the counties of the state.
The immediate tasks before the campaign committee were
to place in circulation initiative petitions to obtain 300,000 sig-
natures so that the proposed amendment could be placed on the
ballot. Meanwhile, an educational program was developed
through the support of various lay organizations and the news-
papers of the state. The reaction of the newspapers as reflected
by their editorials was particularly noteworthy.
The Ohio Committee on Judicial Selection has been con-
ducting its educational and petition circulating campaign since
March, 1937. According to Joseph C. Hostetler, state chair-
man, the present objective of the committee is to submit the
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proposed amendment to a vote of the people at the November,
1938, election.
The proposed amendment provides for the appointment of
the seven judges of the Ohio Supreme Court and the 27 judges
of the nine courts of appeals in the state. There are approxi-
mately 300 common pleas, probate, and municipal judges in
the state who would continue to be elected as at present. The
amendment provides, however, that by a majority vote the
electors of a county may bring their common pleas and probate
judges under the appointive provisions of the amendment and
the voters of a municipality may do likewise with respect to
their municipal judges. Any county or municipality having
adopted the appointive system may rescind its action but the
question of rescinding shall not be submitted to the electors
more than once in six years.
The requirement of the amendment, that judges of the
supreme and appellate courts be appointed while the common
pleas, probate, and municipal judges continue to be elected until
such time as by local option those judges also become appoint-
ive, is entitled to an explanation. It is readily apparent that in
the predominantly rural counties the people have an oppor-
tunity to be, and are, much more familiar with the qualifications
of the judges than in the larger centers of population. It may
be concluded, therefore, that with respect to the county and
municipal judges the knowledge possessed by the voters as to
the qualifications of those judges will, very largely, depend
upon the population of the county. If it is a rural county, a
larger percentage of the voters are personally acquainted with
the judge and without doubt the prestige of his office and person
places the voters in a position to make a satisfactory selection.
By the same reasoning, the county and municipal judges in the
thickly populated counties and cities are comparatively unknown
to the voters and the possibilities of making a satisfactory selec-
tion become more remote.
Because this is an accepted fact, the amendment permits
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those counties desiring to do so to adopt the appointive system.
This leaves the door open for each county and city to determine
which system is better for, its local courts.
With respect to the supreme and appellate court judges, the
situation is similar in all counties. The voters in one county
have as little knowledge of the qualifications of the higher
court judges as the voters in any other county. Judges of the
supreme court are elected by the voters of all the counties.
Voters of the counties in an appellate district select the court of
appeals judges. There are an average of approximately ten
counties in each appellate district. Being farther removed from
direct contact with the people less is known by the average voter
regarding the qualifications of the higher court judges. The
result is that the voters will either refuse to express a choice
for the judges or many will vote blindly thereby placing a
premium on a candidate with a vote-getting name. According
to the election statistics compiled by the Secretary of State,
there were over one million people in Ohio who voted for other
candidates at the 1936 election but expressed no choice among
the candidates for the Supreme Court of Ohio and there were
48,ooo in Franklin County who failed to vote for any of the
court of appeals judges in this district. For these reasons, the
appointive system is mandatory as to the supreme and appellate
courts; optional as to the county and municipal courts.
The amendment makes no changes in the number or com-
pensation of the judges.
There are four steps in the selection of the judges affected
by the amendment. They are: (i) Nomination; (2) Appoint-
ment; (3) Confirmation; (4) Ratification. These four steps are
consecutive and will be hereafter described.
(i) Nomination.
The nominations are made by a judicial council. This coun-
cil is to be composed of eight members. The chief justice of
the Supreme Court is president of the council. Other members
are: a court of appeals judge selected'by the appellate judges in
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the state; a common pleas judge selected by the common pleas
judges in the state; a probate judge selected by the probate
judges in the state, and a municipal judge selected by the mu-
nicipal judges in the state. This makes five judges.
Then there are three practicing attorneys appointed by the
governor. Their terms are staggered so that one will be leav-
ing and one coming on the council every year. The chief justice
is president and a member of the council so long as he holds
the office of chief justice. The other seven members of the
council serve terms of three years limited to two consecutive
terms. The amendment provides that the judges of the courts
of appeals, common pleas, probate, and municipal courts shall
meet during the January following the adoption of the amend-
ment at which time each group will select its representative on
the judicial council.
No compensation is provided for the members of the ju-
dicial council.
In 1925, there was passed an act establishing a judicial
council, consisting of the chief justice and certain representa-
tives of each order of judges, together with three members of
the bar, whose function is to study and report upon the workings
of the judicial system of the state. (IIo Ohio Laws 364). In
his Historical Introduction to Volume I, Ohio Jurisprudence,
Clarence D. Laylin of the Columbus Bar, and former Professor
of Law in the College of Law at the Ohio State University,
says with respect to the judicial council:
"Lack of legslative appropriations has rendered this machinery thus
far ineffective. But, should the demand for reform become more insist-
ent, the judicial council, itself the one unified judicial agency at the
command of the state, bids fair to perform a signal service in that
direction." (I Ohio Juris., cv [1928])
Under the provisions of the proposed constitutional amend-
ment, when a judicial office to be filled by appointment becomes
or is about to become vacant, the governor shall certify that
fact to the judicial council. Within thirty days after such certi-
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fication is received, the judicial council submits to the governor
the names and qualifications of not less than three or more than
five persons, qualified electors of the judicial district of the
court in which such vacancy is to be filled, whom the judicial
council deems qualified to hold such office.
The members of the Bar were in general agreement that
there ought to be an officially designated agency to make the
nominations. Unlimited power of selection by the governor
opens the door to the possibility of appointing judges as a
reward for political support.
The question of personnel of the judicial council was the
subject of great study on the part of the committee. The council
could be composed of those representatives best qualified by
experience, ability, and interest to prepare a suitable list of
nominations, or, it could be composed of representatives of
various groups and interests in the state selected because of the
interest which they represented rather than because of familiar-
ity with the qualifications of a judge. To extend the member-
ship of the judicial council to representatives of so-called
"interests" raises some serious economic, religious and racial
questions. If it was determined that the farmers should have
a representative on the judicial council, who would select him?
Must he be identified with the Grange or Farm Bureau? If
labor must have a representative, who would appoint him?
Must he be identified with the A. F. of L. or the C.I.O.? This
illustrates the difficulties if the judicial council is to be composed
of representatives of minority groups. The problem is to de-
termine which groups are to be represented on the council and
who selects the representative. In view of all these conditions,
the conclusion that the judicial council should be composed of
five judges and three lawyers selected in the manner already
described appears to offer the best assurance that the nominees
will be selected primarily on the basis of ability and experience.
(2) Appointment
It has already been stated that the judicial council submits
to the governor the names and qualifications of not less than
three or more than five persons for each vacancy to be filled by
appointment. From this list the governor must make the
appointment.
There was general agreement that the appointment, under
the conditions described in the amendment, should be made by
the governor who is directly responsible to the people.
(3) Confirzation
The governor's appointment must be confirmed by the sen-
ate. An exception is made in the case of a judge holding office
by election at the time of the adoption of the amendment. If
at the expiration of his elective term he is appointed to succeed
himself, senate confirmation is not required. As to appoint-
ments which are made when the senate is not in session, the
question of confirmation will be determined either in its next
regular session, or in special session which the governor is au-
thorized to call for the purpose of confirming judicial appoint-
ments. If the senate denies confirmation or fails to confirm any
judicial appointment within sixty days, the governor makes
another appointment from the names submitted by the judicial
council, and submits the name to the senate; and so on until
the vacancy is filled.
The members of the senate are elected by the people and
directly responsible to them. The requirement of senate con-
firmation permits the legislative branch of the government to
exercise a check on the selection.
(4) Ratification
The word "ratification" is here used to emphasize the fact
that the people themselves determine, directly, whether a judge
shall continue in office after having served a definite period.
This particular feature came from the California constitutional
amendment adopted in 1934-
Under the proposed Ohio amendment, at the first general
election occurring after the judge has served six years follow-
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ing his appointment, and at the general election occurring every
sixth year thereafter so long as such judge remains in office, his
name shall be placed on the ballot in the judicial district of the
court for which he was appointed with the number of years of
his service stated and with the question, "Shall Judge .....................
(giving his name) be retained in office?" If a majority of those
voting on this question vote in the negative, the judge will be
retired from office at the end of thirty days, and the office will
be declared vacant; otherwise, the judge shall continue in office.
This procedure is what is called "running against the rec-
ord." It is distinguished from the present elective system
because the judge does not run against a competing candidate
for continuance in office. It has often been stated that the
knowledge that a competing candidate is in the field stimulates
campaigning and causes judges to consume much of their time,
energy, and financial resources to assure their continuance in
office. It is contended that this provision in the amendment
will, to a large extent, eliminate campaigning and political alli-
ances which have, under the present system, appeared indis-
pensable to the judge seeking reelection.
In reviewing the four steps in the selection of judges under
this amendment, it will be observed that an effort has been
made to accomplish two major objectives. The first is to pre-
serve the best features of both the elective and appointive sys-
tems and eliminat6 the worst features of both. The second is
to establish a system of judicial selection thoroughly in accord
with our democratic principles of government.
Reverting to the first objective we note that the amendment
eliminates the two major criticisms of the usual appointive sys-
tem which are: (i) Unlimited power of selection by the chief
executive. The amendment requires the governor to make his
selection from a list of nominees submitted by the judicial
council. (2) Tenure for life, which is a burden if the judge
becomes incompetent, dictatorial, or unfit for office. The
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amendment requires the judge to run against his record every
six years.
The better features of the usual appointive system
which are presented by the amendment include: (i) Greater
independence; (2) Selection based principally upon experience,
ability, and character thereby attracting the best qualified; (3)
Security of tenure based upon merit.
The criticisms of the usual elective system which the amend-
ment eliminates are: (i) Campaigning for officei (2) Inse-
curity; (3) Political interference; (4) Insufficient knowledge
of candidates' qualifications to permit voters to make intelligent
choice; (4) The showman or ballyhoo type of candidate, who
has the advantage regardless of qualifications for judicial office.
The better features of the usual elective system are retained
by the amendment through the provision that the judge must
run against his record every six years for continuance in office.
Rather than decide between two or more candidates, none of
whom may be competent, the people decide whether the judge
who has served six years is satisfactory. This, after all, seems
to be the important question for the people to determine.
The second objective, to establish a system of selection in
accord with our democratic principles of government, was also
given careful consideration. That the amendment accomplishes
this is apparent from an analysis of it. The nominations are
made by the judicial council of which five of the eight members
are judges. In other words, the judiciary is predominant in
making the nominations. The appointment is made by the
governor, the head of the executive branch of the government,
selected by direct vote of the people. Confirmation is required
by the senate, a branch of the legislature, the members of which
are selected by direct vote of the people. Finally, the people,
by direct vote, determine whether the judge's services have
been satisfactory. Here then, under the amendment, we have
the three co-ordinate branches of the government-judicial,
executive, legislative-each having a definite responsibility in
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the selection of the judges. Their action and the record of the
judge is then weighed by the people whose decision may retire
the judge from office.
Those features of the amendment which apply generally
have already been described. According to its schedule, the
amendment becomes effective immediately upon adoption. It
is specifically provided that judges of the Supreme Court and
courts of appeals now in office shall continue therein until the
end of the terms for which they were respectively elected, un-
less they are removed, die, or resign.
To fill a vacancy caused by the expiration of the term of any
judge holding office by election at the time of the adoption of
the amendment, the certification by the judicial council and the
appointment by the governor shall be completed at least seventy
days before the general election next preceding the expiration
of such elective term. If such judge is appointed to succeed
himself, confirmation by the senate is not required; but if he is
not appointed to succeed himself, he may, within sixty days of
such election, file with the Secretary of State his application to
have his name and that of the person appointed to succeed him,
submitted at the general election to the voters of the judicial
district of the court in which such vacancy is to be filled. The
Secretary of State then causes the two names to be placed upon
the ballot, and the person receiving the greater number of votes
is commissioned as judge the same as though appointed under
the amendment, and senate confirmation is not required.
The purpose of this feature of the amendment is to protect
those judges elected to office prior to the adoption of the amend-
ment, but whose terms expire after the amendment becomes
effective. As to them, the appointment must be made seventy
days prior to the general election next preceding the expiration
of their terms, so that, if the judge is not appointed to succeed
himself, he may run against the person appointed to succeed
him. Whoever receives the greater number of votes assumes
the office under the same conditions as if he were appointed.
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Another feature of the amendment is the provision that the
incumbent of a judicial office shall continue in office until his
successor has been appointed or elected. This provision elim-
inates the so-called "short term" which occurs under the present
system where an appointed judge fills a vacancy only until the
next general election at which time a judge is elected to com-
plete the unexpired term. Whenever a vacancy occurs in any
common pleas, probate, or municipal court, the governor fills
the vacancy by appointment, as at present, but, under the
amendment the appointee serves for the remaining period of
the unexpired term, rather than until the next general election
as at present.
The amendment also enjoins the legislature to enact laws
providing for the retirement, because of age or disability, and
for compensation during retirement, of the judges.
This concludes an analysis of the provisions of the amend-
ment.
Attention is now directed to a consideration of the argu-
ments presented by those who look with disfavor upon the
amendment. Opponents of the proposal fall within three
classes. One class is composed of those who oppose the proposal
for reasons of expediency. They may hope to gain more, per-
sonally, from the elective system either as a non-candidate
through the exercise of political influence, or, as a candidate
because they excel at political campaigning. To this group
only one answer may be given, that being that the welfare of
the people of the state as a whole, through the improvement of
the judiciary far transcends in importance the personal advance-
ment of any one individual.
A second class of opposition comes from those who are in
sympathy with the purpose and general intent of the proposal
but disagree with certain details of the amendment. The only
answer to this group is that no plan of judicial selection could
be devised which would meet the approval of everyone in every
detail. It has already been related, however, that during a
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period of approximately five years a committee of the Ohio
State Bar Association labored diligently to ascertain all views
on the subject. Five different plans of selection were studied
during that period and from these were combed those features
which met with the general approval of the greater number
of the members of the Bar. Those who oppose the amendment
because of disagreement with minor details must seek comfort
in the realization that unanimity of opinion as to details is sel-
dom achieved in enterprises involving human beings. The
finished product represents necessary minor compromises. But
the plan in general is the measure of its value. If it constitutes
an improvement over the present system, is it not worthy
of trial?
A third class of opposition comes from those who conscien-
tiously oppose the principle of the proposed amendment. Since
they are honest in their belief, their views must be respected and
their arguments against the proposal must be answered by logic.
What are the principal arguments advanced against the amend-
ment?
It has been contended that there is no more reason for the
appointment of judges than, say, the governor or members of
the legislature. This statement fails to consider the difference
in the nature and duties of the offices. Voters express their
choice for executive and legislative officials on the basis of poli-
cies and issues. Those officials initiate, enact, and enforce the
laws in accordance with the expressed wish of the people.
During the campaign for election, their views on issues are
ascertained and made available to the people through public
addresses, the press, the radio, and every other means of pub-
licity. But the judge is different. He is not selected on the
basis of issues. His views on issues dare not be predetermined.
His "issues" are his character and ability which do not make
the headlines. He is the umpire not the player. Because of
the nature of his office, the people generally know less of his
character and ability than of the candidates for executive or
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legislative offices. Furthermore, the duties of the judge require
a person particularly fitted for that office. He must be a student
of the law. He must possess a judicial temperament. He must
be independent. He must be impartial. He must command
respect and confidence. His work is highly specialized and he
must possess the necessary experience and ability if he is to
perform the duties of his office satisfactorily. On this point
Robert N. Wilkin, former judge of the Supreme Court of
Ohio, has said:
"A popularity contest is no more adequate to determine the com-
petency of a judge than the competency of a surgeon, a teacher, or a
mechanic. If the best judges are to exercise the judicial function, they
must be obtained by a process of selection-not election."
It has been contended that the proposed amendment vio-
lates the principles of democracy by removing from the people
the right to select all their judges by popular vote. It has
already been pointed out that the amendment affects only the
34 judges of the supreme and appellate courts, whereas more
than 300 county and municipal judges will continue to be
elected as at present. It has been stated herein that the nature
of the judicial office is such that the people are not in a position
to know the qualifications of the candidates and as a result
either fail to vote for the judges or vote blindly thereby mak-
ing the selection largerly a matter of chance. Furthermore, it
has been related that the amendment requires the judge to run
against his record for continuance in office at which time the
people, by direct vote, determine whether, in their judgment,
his work has been satisfactory. On this point, an editorial ap-
pearing in the Springfield, Ohio News, July 29, 1937, is
pertinent. It reads:
"The question before the house for many months has concerned the
infallibility of the courts, meaning the judge. What shall we say of the
judicial finality of the dictum which Judge Struble of Cincinnati has laid
down in his speech opposing the Ohio amendment for a partly appointive
bench. Said he:
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'Strike down the elective system of government and you
strike down representative government ... If the people are not
capable of electing judges, they are not capable of electing other
officials.'
Would the learned Cincinnati judge admit that we have representa-
tive government in the federal government of the United States? There
is the representative house and there is the representative senate. Also
the people elect the president.
Yet it has never been seriously proposed to elect the chief justice of
the United States, or the associate justices, or the scores of judges of the
district courts and the courts of appeals. It has been agreed that the
people were not in position to make these choices. Representatives of the
people, to-wit, the president and the senate, select the judges. It has
been supposed hitherto that this was representative government and
all right.
How then, could Judge Struble say a thing so contrary to obvious
fact? The mystery can be explained on no theory save that a judge,
even an elected judge of the court of common pleas, may be less than
omniscient and infallible.
There is much nonsense talked, as anyone can see by looking around
him, concerning the supposed necessity of electing everybody who is to
do public work, if the people are to rule. Judge Struble might as well
have said that if the people are not capable of electing their school
teachers or their mail carriers they are not capable of electing other
officials. Yet the people do not elect, do not want to elect, could not
elect, their school teachers, their mail carriers, their policemen, and the
men who build their roads. The mere physical impossibility of it is
obvious to the common sense. The very principle of the representative
government whose fate Judge Struble fears is the election of a few
persons to represent the people in choosing the rest. We elect a congress-
man, two senators, a president; out of them comes the whole federal
service, the personnel of which the people would know themselves crazy
if they tried to pick. We elect a governor and a legislature. Out of
them come the state roads, the administration of workmen's compensa-
tion, the operation of the state's schools. There is nothing more sacred
about the election of a judge than about the election by popular vote
of a president of a state university or the superintendent of your schools."
It has been contended that judges selected in the manner
provided in the amendment are less likely to be liberal in their
interpretation of the laws and less responsive to the will of the
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people. This contention was answered more than twenty years
ago when a special commission under the sponsorship of the
National Economic League made a thorough survey of judicial
decisions in American courts.
The commission consisted of such eminent men as Charles
W. Eliot, Morefield Storey, Roscoe Pound, and Louis D.
Brandeis, associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
I shall quote from the report of the commission:
"The constructive work in American law was done by appointed
judges, while most of the technicality of procedure, mechanical juris-
prudence and narrow adherence to i8th century absolute ideas, of
which the public now complains, is the work of elected judges. The
illiberal decisions of the last quarter of the I9 th century to which objec-
tion is made today, were almost wholly the work of elected judges with
short tenure. Moreover, where today we have appointed judges these
courts in conservative communities have been liberal in questions of con-
stitutional law, where the elective judges, holding for short terms, have
been strict and reactionary."
Whether the people are ready for this change in the method
of selecting judges can be determined only by them through
the power of the ballot. The burden of presenting the case rests
with the Bar of Ohio; the decision with the people. At the
Cincinnati Conference of 1934 the late Newton D. Baker said:
"Will the people, having gotten this power to elect judges, be reluc-
tant to give it up? Frankly, I think that underestimates the intelligence
of the people. It may not be easy to persuade people into the belief, but I
believe if the bar of Ohio went to the people and pointed out what a
judge is, what the qualifications are that a judge ought to have, what
kind of a life he ought to live, what kind of duties he has to perform,
how essentially technical and special they are, how all of those qualifi-
cations and qualities have to do with things that are not worn on the
sleeve for daws to peck at, but are the products of burning the midnight
oil and of the refinement of conscience by duty highly, solemnly, bravely,
and lonely done . . -I believe if that were done, it could be ac-
complished."
